STEPHEN KOTKIN: I think there are a lot of people
out there, but I can’t see anyone. Which is fortunate. I get stage
fright. I have to thank Jean Strouse again for the year at the Cullman
Center. There are many pages of this book that would not be in there had
it not been for the New York Public Library’s collection, and I am very
grateful. In fact, we were just on a tour of some of the holdings
upstairs. Despite working here for thirty years, the curator upstairs,
Thomas Lannon, was showing me things I hadn’t ever seen before. The
riches here are beyond belief.
I thank Paul Holdengräber, of course. He told me, he let slip many
months ago that there was a really big event here, Slavoj Žižek was
going to be at the library, and I said, “Gee, it’s going to sell out.
Can you get me in?” And Paul kept his word. I am in.
I was asked to say a few words before we started the conversation and
so I think I’ll do that. This guy who was very guilty on his deathbed
with his wife there wanted to tell her that he had cheated on her.
He—the guilt was so great that he just blurted it out. “I don’t know how
to tell you this. But while I told you I was late at work . . .” And
she said, “Duh. Why do you think I poisoned you?” You know how many
middle-aged men go out for milk and never come back? Not enough. Not
enough. Do we have time for questions?
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Yes. Is your wife here? When you told the milk story?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Yes, yes, she is. Yes she is here.
Or as Joan Rivers liked to say, “You know a man can do what he wants and
have as many affairs but if a woman makes nineteen or twenty mistakes,
she’s a tramp. It’s very unfair. Very unfair.”
Anyway, yes I wrote this book, and I have to thank Scott Moyers, of
Penguin Press, because I wrote a book that was almost a book and because
of Scott it became an actual book, and I’m extremely grateful for that.
Ideal editor. So maybe a couple of words about what I tried to do and
then the questions.
So it’s kind of silly to write yet another book about Stalin. Don’t
we already know the story? Don’t we already have as many Stalin books as
we need? After all, I understand from Tony Marx that there are limits
to the storage under Bryant Park and some of us should cease and desist.
So there are three ways, I think, that I tried to do something
different and whether I succeeded or not we’ll find out. One way was to
widen the lens a little bit, to open up to the full sweep of history,
Russian history and global history. So this is not a book about Stalin
in history, this is actually a book about history or about Russian power
in the world and then Stalin’s power in Russia. So for example there’s a
full chapter on World War I, but Stalin didn’t do anything in World War
I, but without World War I, he could have never gotten anywhere near
the seat of power. And so I believe, maybe I’m mistaken, but I believe
that the wider view, the big sweep of history, enables us to understand
him better.
The second thing I did was to put the politics at the center of the
story, so instead of a weird demonic personality that formed maybe in
childhood or some other way and that then had an influence on politics, I
demonstrate, I hope, that the politics is what formed Stalin’s
personality and it was the experience of building a personal
dictatorship and exercising power that made him the kind of person he
became. And therefore there’s a lot of stuff about him at Party
congresses, about him behind the scenes, about him preparing for
speeches, about the intrigues he’s engaged in and the ways in which, as I
say, this shaped him as a person.
And I think the third thing that I did, or at least I tried to do,
was to be very comprehensive and scrupulous in the sources, meaning,
take nothing for granted and go back and read everything including the
avalanche of new materials that have come out in the last fifteen years.
So there are three or four thousand endnotes in Volume I to the primary
source original materials, Stalin’s personal archive, KGB archive,
military archive, foreign policy archive, et cetera. Many people are
working on these materials, I’m not alone obviously in doing this, but I
tried to synthesize all the new stuff that’s come out and be very
comprehensive, as I said.
So the sort of Russian power in the world story, the politics at the
center of Stalin’s life creating the person he became, and then the deep
immersion in the primary source materials, I think those are some of
the perhaps the distinguishing characteristics of the book. So I could
talk further about what I think is in the book, but I think at this
point maybe my friend Slavoj Žižek might launch the conversation.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Thanks very much. First, thanks to all
the organizers, Paul and others. Second point, I’m really honored to be
here with you because that’s the type of book I think we who are all
fascinated by Stalin were waiting. First I would like to begin if I may
improvise a little bit with the feature you mentioned at the end, how,
yes, we should avoid this I will now use a horrible Marxist term, this
bourgeois liberal way of looking for a private secret, some vice,
whatever, which explains the political horror. You adopted the right
road.
Even those—that’s for me the tragedy, and I’m saying this as still a
radical leftist—even, for example, in films, films which appear to be
ruthlessly critical of communism are, in a way, because of this approach
too soft in some way. Let me repeat you an old story that I like to
use, I hope all of you saw, it got Oscar as best foreign movie, you
remember some ten years ago, Leben der Anderen, Life of Others,
the guy’s fanatically, because he comes from East Prussian nobility,
the director, so he wanted—this is his revenge against the German
Democratic Republic. But you remember what’s the story, a well-known
East German playwright has a beautiful wife, some obscure minister wants
to have—wants to have his wife, so he puts all the Stasi apparatus on
him and so on. But and then you have that the main hero is a half
personally honest Stasi agent. But wait a minute! The movie is too soft
on the regime. The point is to be brutal and say that that in a country
like GDR, even if no minister wants to fuck your wife, you would have
been under total observation and so on and so on. You know, as if to
have this secret police investigation to be its object, there has to be
some private vice. And I think this is way too soft.
In the sense you know what Steven Weinberg, the quantum cosmologist,
said, I don’t totally agree with it, I feel great respect for
Christianity, but there is an element of truth in it when he wrote
somewhere that without religion good people would be doing good things
and bad people bad things; you need something like religion to make good
people do horrible things. That’s the true problem.
The true problem is easy to explain when you have an easy guy, blah
blah, for example when I read and I wonder what you will say in your
next volume. All those campaigns for collectivization, late twenties,
early thirties, there were many let’s call them naively honest, sincere
communists who went there and they were trained to disregard bourgeois
compassion. That’s for me the true ethical tragedy. When you make a
basically good decent guy do horrible things and for this you need I
said as you said to focus on politics, as you beautifully said, politics
focuses characters. It’s not this absurd psychoanalytic approach where
let’s look for some personal trauma to explain it.
The second thing because of which I really enjoyed your book is I
noticed how in the tradition of Western Marxism, although of course they
are anti-Stalinists, but it always shocked me to what extent, look at
all of Frankfurt School up to Habermas, any consistent theory of
Stalinism is totally missing. But why? This was for me an enigma. Look,
let’s make a mental experiment. You probably know Jürgen Habermas.
Imagine your only source of information about post-World War II Germany
would have been the work, the texts written by Habermas. Reading all his
texts, I doubt that you would ever learn that there were two Germanys.
But you learn a lot of fascism and so on. You know what’s the basic
insight of Frankfurt School: dialectic of enlightenment, which means
horrors of the twentieth century are not simply some remainder but are
the product of the immanent antagonisms of modernity. But here Stalinism
is much clearer example than fascism. And so why it is missing, so I
think Stalinism still for me remains an enigma.
So now let me go to a part of the book which I really enjoyed. I will
not ask you about too many details, because I’m an idiot, you know much
more, so I would only display my stupidity. There are other ways to do
it. What I really like and here I would like to challenge you if you
could elaborate things a bit, bit more. In the conclusion, last pages of
the book, you address this obvious big question: was the so-called
Stalinist system, deeper I hate this terminology, orthodox Marxist,
historical necessity with Stalin but if not Stalin then there had been
another guy or was it and if to what extent it was something the
Stalinist system we know that depended on the contingent fact that
Stalin was the one who took over.
Now, on the one hand, I hope you would agree we cannot put everything
on Stalin because if nothing else there must have been a certain
structure of power so that it was possible for a guy like Stalin to take
over in the first place but and then I always distrust this simplistic
view shared by some Trotskyists and others that this is the dream at its
purest. If only Lenin was to survive three, four years more, made the
pact with Trotsky, all totally different. Maybe. But I basically agree
with you a lot did depend on the contingency of Stalin’s personality.
You describe this wonderfully but nonetheless where would you have set
the limit?
I’m asking you what we philosophers call a counterfactual question,
you know, like was it I think I’m more of a pessimist and I am the
radical leftist here. I think in a way the whole project Bolshevik was
at the deeper level doomed from the beginning. I don’t think there was a
possibility of something, maybe it would have been a little bit better
with Lenin at least in the last years. He was very resigned, you know,
he even said, forget about constructing socialism, we should just bring a
little bit of Western civilization to Russia and so on. So if I can ask
you later some other questions so that I don’t like too much, how would
you be more precise—
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Maybe I could answer this one.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Yes to this one.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Maybe I could answer this one. I don’t know if I can. But I’m going to try. We’ll see.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: And Central Committee, which speaks through me, will tell you if you succeeded or not.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Yeah, brings back memories of writing the book.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Yeah.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: So this is a book about ideas. The
revelation of the communist archives, the secret of the communist
archives is that behind closed doors they spoke the same way to each
other when nobody else was listening as they spoke in their public
propaganda. They spoke about class warfare, kulaks, rich peasants,
finance capital, bourgeois revolution, socialist revolution, privately
that’s how they spoke. It turns out the secret archives have shown that
the communists behind closed doors were communists. That’s the big
revelation, and that turns out to matter. Because if your system is
based on the Federalist papers or your system is based upon Marx and
Lenin, you’re going to get different outcomes. Not exclusively based
upon those things because many factors are at play here: state-to-state
relations, geopolitics, the international system.
So Stalin had the idea that small countries that had used to been
part of the Russian empire were not sovereign, they didn’t decide their
own foreign policy, they were playthings or instruments for the great
powers. Poland was independent as a result of the dissolution of the
czarist empire. Finland was independent, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, but
their independence was not real, because they would be used by the
British or later by the Nazi Germans to invade the Soviet Union, to
overthrow the Soviet system. So what they called the limitrofa or the
near abroad or the borderlands were independent countries on the map but
not in Stalin’s mind. And so therefore he sought to prevent those
countries from becoming playthings in the hands of the Western powers.
So he tried to do coups in those countries, overturn those systems,
because that was his way of guaranteeing Soviet security. This is the
1920s already.
Now, if you noticed, President Putin regarding Crimea and Ukraine
said that Ukraine is not a real country and the Ukrainian army is the
foreign legion of NATO. This is the vocabulary out of the 1920s military
intelligence files that were on Stalin’s desk and that he marked with
his blue or red pencil. So that’s a big factor, and we can’t explain the
Stalin phenomenon, we can’t explain Russia today without the
geopolitics and then, of course, there was the fact that they were
communists, which means that they were not trying to ameliorate the
market, ameliorate capitalism, fix it on the edges, redistribute a
little bit of income from the upper to the lower. They were not social
democrats who accepted capitalism, private property, and the markets.
They were communists. They were there to destroy, eradicate, and as
Hegel said, transcend capitalism. It was aufheben, transcendence of capitalism. And they believed this.
It’s clear from the internal documents that yes, Stalin was concerned
about power. Yes, his personal power was critically important, but not
alone. He was a true believer, like Lenin and like the rest of them.
Now, the path wasn’t always straight to the eradication of capitalism.
They had to make concessions along the way. But there was no top
Bolshevik ever in the 1920s who comes out and says “markets are good,
private property is good, capitalism should endure in our system.” They
fight about how to eradicate it and when to eradicate it but not about
the principle of it. This is very, very important, because we sometimes
confuse the communists with the social democrats, who in Germany, for
example, who came to accept evolution instead of revolution and came to
accept the market and private property, they continued to want to
ameliorate the conditions that capitalism caused. But they accepted
eventually what we would know as the Swedish social democratic model or
the European social democratic model. This was not Lenin and this was
not Stalin. They were playing for keeps and that mattered.
But the final point, to answer your question. After you take into
account the geopolitics and after you take into account the communist
ideas which were real for them, you’re still left with the fact that how
did he do this? How did he manage to enslave a hundred million
peasants, collectivize agriculture? How did he manage to eradicate
markets and private property? The others in the regime didn’t think he
could do it and they thought it would be a catastrophe if he tried. And
it was a catastrophe, they were correct. The critics of Stalin before he
launched collectivization, which is were Volume I ends, predicted
disaster and their predictions came true. In fact it was worse than
their predictions.
But the thing about Stalin that differentiated him from the others,
what made Stalin different was that he did it. He went all the way to
the end. Famine, five to seven million dead from starvation. Forty
million at least starved but survived. Cannibalism. The regime itself
was destabilized. His personal dictatorship was destabilized. He kept
going until collectivization was a hundred percent, until capitalism had
been eradicated in the countryside. And so this is unusual. I don’t
think there was another person inside the regime sharing Stalin’s views
on foreign policy, sharing Stalin’s views on communism, I don’t think
somebody else could have done this.
And so in a way, Stalin was—it’s never necessary to kill tens of
millions of people. It’s never necessary, that’s a criminal act, and
progress doesn’t come from murder, especially on the scale that Stalin
engaged in. But from the communist point of view, there was no other way
to eliminate capitalism, markets, and private property in the
countryside. You see, because voluntary collectivization, as of 1928,
the year Stalin made his decision, was 1 percent of the arable land. It
was only the peasants who couldn’t farm at all who joined the
collectives, and they were sixteen households, seventeen households on
average, 1 percent of the arable land. There was no voluntary
collectivization. There was only coercive collectivization.
But if you believe that capitalism is imperialist war, if you believe
that capitalism is wage slavery, if you believe that capitalism is
injustice and alienation and all the things that they believed in, you
try to overcome, transcend, aufheben of the capitalism. It turned out
that the answer was worse than the phenomenon that they were critiquing,
Stalinism was worse than the capitalist exploitation, but nonetheless
he was able to pull this off, and that’s very unusual. That’s his
contribution. His contribution was the willpower inside this system to
enact this full-scale state-ization, elimination of markets and private
property, which didn’t happen in very many places, and nobody thought it
was going to happen here, and Stalin unfortunately saw it through, so
in that sense his contribution is colossal.
He couldn’t have done it without the Communist Party, he couldn’t
have done it without the ideology, he couldn’t have done it without the
state of siege, so-called capitalist encirclement, he couldn’t have done
it without millions of young people who wanted to participate in the
building of a new world. Many factors played into his ability to do this
but I don’t think anybody else in the regime could have managed to go
it all the way he did.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Can I do a counterquestion? Now I
basically see what you want to say but I’m a little bit perplexed. In
what sense? The way you describe it now is just that we have this
background of communist ideology shared by all, and Stalin was just
going to the end in will and so on. Okay, so let’s play this
counterfactual game. Without Stalin or let’s say in ’24 Stalin has a car
accident or whatever. What do you think would have happened? Just the
same system, maybe a little bit more moderate, not even that?
Because—sorry, let me finish.
Another thing that I admire in your book when you describe all those
factional struggles, Trotskyists, I’m sorry if there are some
Trotskyites here to offend you, is the sheer stupidity of Trotsky. How,
you know, how to call it, the ground beneath him was Stalin taking over
and Trotsky just arrogantly waiting for the—he really believed in
himself, he thought, “let that small stupid Georgian bureaucrat do his
job, with one big speech I’m the hero of civil war.” So again what would
have happened without Stalin? I know it’s a stupid question, but it has
a certain weight I think.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: I don’t think it’s a stupid question at all. I think it’s exactly the right question.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: So what’s your right answer?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Yes, not to put me on the spot, but I appreciate that.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: I mean, let’s say Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev take over in ’25. Okay, they were on opposite sides, I know.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: So Trotsky is a very talented
individual. He’s a great speaker and he is extraordinary, dynamic,
charismatic personality. However this was not a speaking job. This was a
job for different talent, which was behind-the-scenes intrigue,
backstabbing, coalition-building, gaining others to your side, reducing
your enemies by dividing them, many talents that he proved not to have
in the struggle with Stalin. I’ll also say that Stalin was a better
Leninist than Trotsky.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Define Leninism here.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Stalin had flexibility. Lenin was
very extreme in his principles. He would not compromise his principles
except when he needed to compromise his principles to realize his
principles. He was the ultimate pragmatist, flexible in pursuit of the
goals that he would never yield on. Trotsky lacked that type of
pragmatism and flexibility. Stalin learned it from Lenin. He was Lenin’s
pupil, not just in self-styling but actual, in fact. Moreover, Trotsky
constantly tried to make himself Lenin’s equal or even Lenin’s better.
And so Lenin was the father of the revolution, everybody saw Lenin as on
a different plane, but Trotsky would write pamphlets after 1917, after
the seizure of power, recalling how he had corrected Lenin when they had
had arguments.
And Stalin would write pamphlets instead about how he was Lenin’s
pupil, Lenin’s heir, and would faithfully execute everything that Lenin
had taught him and taught us all, and this positioning as Lenin’s pupil
as opposed to Lenin’s equal or Lenin’s better and this ability to
retreat, tactically retreat or go sideways when the frontal path was
closed. Stalin learned as I said this kind of tactics from Lenin and
therefore, in a way, Stalin was a better Leninist than Trotsky was.
But what would have happened had Stalin died or had there been no
Stalin? So the regime as it was in the 1920s was a single-party
dictatorship. Industry was owned by the state and in the countryside,
where the vast majority of people lived and where the wealth was, the
size of the harvest was the main factor in GDP, was a private capitalist
system more or less.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: After NEP.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Quasi market, so-called New Economic
Policy. From the early 1920s through the late 1920s. There was no New
Economic Policy in industry, it was state-owned, so-called commanding
heights, only about 10 percent of GDP that was manufacturing was
artisan, artisanal production. And there was no political New Economic
Policy, because there was a single-party dictatorship and censorship,
but there was a quasi market in the countryside, where as I said more
than 80 percent of the people lived and where the wealth was produced.
And so there were actually two revolutions—the urban, Bolshevik,
communist single-party dictatorship with censorship based upon a vision
of an industrial future, and the peasant revolution, which was separate,
independent, and too strong for the Bolsheviks, too strong for the
communists, that’s why they conceded the New Economic Policy. And all
throughout the twenties they were wringing their hands, all right,
banging their heads against the wall. What are we going to do about this
capitalist-like peasant revolution in the countryside? Are we going to
confront it or not? And if we’re going to confront it, how is that even
possible, because we have almost no communists in the countryside. The
countryside was out of their control. The red flags, the red banners,
the slogans, they disappeared right after you left the big cities, they
vanished.
And so this problem of the regime’s fate, the revolution’s fate in
the 1920s was clear to them all. Now, Stalin built a personal
dictatorship within the dictatorship. This was an act of unbelievable
skill that the book devotes a great deal of attention to. Now, Stalin
was no genius, he made many mistakes. He had no understanding of
fascism, for example, which was a big thing to get wrong. So we don’t
want to make him out to be better than he was, he was very blinkered.
But when it came to building a communist—building a personal
dictatorship inside the communist dictatorship, he was very good at
that. And that’s what he did, so he had the authority to make decisions
that others couldn’t participate in, even, let alone make. So he was
controlling the situation with his personal dictatorship, but he didn’t
have control over the country, that’s very important.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Through the twenties, throughout the twenties.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Correct. Correct. And so you can imagine without him who’s talented enough to keep the dictatorship together? And you look—
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Do you see any potential candidates?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: You look inside the Bolshevik regime
and you don’t see such talented people at the top. Now of course some
people come out of nowhere, right? All of a sudden. They are, I don’t
know, in the senate for a day or two and then they are president—right?
That happens. So it could be that somebody else could have come up from
somewhere in the regime that we underestimate now because they didn’t
have that opportunity. But if you look at the actual goings-on in the
regime at the time you’d be pessimistic about a figure with that skill
level on the inside of the regime. Moreover, the regime couldn’t manage
the quasi market. It kept ruining its own New Economic Policy such that
the peasants didn’t deliver the grain anymore. And so—
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: This is the crisis of when—’28?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: It’s already ’26, ’27, ’28, it wasn’t working anymore.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: And they lost nerves, they tried violent—
STEPHEN KOTKIN: The communist regime in a capitalist
world, a capitalist-dominated world, and with a capitalist-like
countryside, was a minoritarian regime and it was in trouble. And it
looks to me like—of course we’ll never know, but it looks to me like the
regime would have collapsed. It looks to me like they would have
softened the one-party dictatorship.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: They would have to, they would be forced.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: They would not have been able to
hold it together and we would have ended up with either a new crisis
that spawned violence and another kind, maybe a military dictatorship, a
right-wing dictatorship or a different version of the left, or we would
have had themselves conceding and evolving towards a recognition that
the capitalist-like countryside was here to stay, and we would have a
mixed economy and therefore we would have a mixed polity also. Now the
interesting comparison here is contemporary China, Deng Xiaoping.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: That’s what I was going to say, could Bukharin have been a Russian Deng Xiaoping?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Deng Xiaoping conceded the market in
the economy but of course held the communist monopoly, which is
retained to this day. And so this lesson of retaining central control
somehow, but giving up the ideology in the economy is an example that
the Chinese have now taught us. Whether this was possible in the 1920s
conditions is unclear. The international situation is a factor here, the
ability to get loans and international banks or other forms of
financing to participate in the world economy was under threat because
they had repudiated the czarist loans. The infrastructure was quite
poor. There were many factors here including that there was no Deng
Xiaoping in the 1920s regime, which is no minor factor.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: You think Bukharin was not strong enough.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Nikolai Bukharin unfortunately was
not a significant politician and did not have the skill set necessary to
be a leader. Alexei Rykov, who was the number-two person in the regime,
he had Lenin’s position. Remember, Lenin was the head of the
government, effectively the prime minister, and Rykov inherited that
position after Lenin died in January 1924. He was a very powerful,
effective manager and a smart politician, and Stalin relied on him to
run the economy all throughout the twenties and Rykov was not removed
even though Bukharin was removed, Stalin still had to rely on Rykov.
Rykov chaired the Politburo meetings because the head of the
government by tradition from Lenin chaired the Politburo meetings.
Stalin was the head of the Party but not the head of the government like
Rykov was. So Rykov was the number-two person in the regime and he’s
the most significant person after Stalin. So I looked very closely at
Rykov and his biography, you know, reexamining the original materials on
Rykov. And he’s an impressive figure but he’s also a communist. We have
the impression because Rykov opposed Stalin’s forced collectivization
that maybe he was a little bit pro market, or pro quasi market.
It turns out that Rykov had no special love for the peasants and no
special love for capitalism, private property, and the markets. His
argument was that it would be catastrophic if we tried to overturn it
and so we can’t do that at this time, but at some point we will have to
go after the markets, go after private property, and get to socialism,
socialism being a stage to communism, right? Feudalism, capitalism,
socialism, communism. Socialism was not the end point, it’s the
intermediate stage. And so unfortunately Rykov was not a person like
Deng Xiaoping who accepted the permanent existence of markets and
private property. The guy who came closest, and he’s a semihero in the
book, was named Girsh Brilliant, Diamond, Girsh Brilliant, and his name
is Sokolnikov, remember nobody has their real names, and this is the
Russian Revolution, right, Stalin’s name was Dzhugashvili, and
Sokolnikov, who was the finance minister, came the closest to accepting
the market as a permanent institution, almost on the edge of social
democracy, and in fact Sokolnikov came at a Party congress and asked
Stalin to resign his post as general secretary.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: When?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: In 1925. December 1925. It was a
bold, very courageous speech, it was a speech on principle that no
person should have this much power and that there should be democracy
inside the Party, not democracy for multiparties, but democracy inside
the Party. That was a step at least.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: And when did Sokolnikov disappear in Gulag?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: And Sokolnikov was removed. Stalin removed him reluctantly—
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Immediately?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: In January 1926 from finance
commissar, but he kept him in the Central Committee, that’s how
important Sokolnikov. Sokolnikov invented the currency, he’s the one who
made the new economic policy function, relying on the bankers and
economists left over from the czarist regime but smart enough to take
their advice. Anyway so there were some figures, Bukharin wouldn’t have
been one of them, but Rykov and Sokolnikov.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: That’s interesting, yes.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Were the ones that I singled out
towards the end, through the book but especially toward the end if
Stalin had died. So one could imagine people like that avoiding collapse
by reluctantly, grudgingly coming around to accepting the market the
way Deng Xiaoping reluctantly grudgingly came around to accepting the
market in the late seventies and early eighties, but there’s little
evidence that they were prepared to do that in the twenties.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: And even did they have a strong enough
base, by base I mean not in people, who cares about that, but in
nomenclatura, bureaucracy?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: If Stalin had died, Rykov would have
been strong enough to take power, yes, there’s no question, but
unfortunately Stalin didn’t die.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Can I go on? I have so many
provocative questions. First, one this is where I totally agree with
you, it’s extremely important what you said at the beginning. I think
that you know you always think they speak jargon. No, fuck it, you go in
the back, privately, it’s exactly the same language, it’s totally wrong
this vision they were dirty manipulators, it’s something—no, it’s the
same.
It reminds me of there is another, I forgot which one sorry, a Spike
Lee movie where you have people you know how in the twenties even white
performers painted their faces black like Al Jolson and so on, and what
happens there is that you have performers painting their faces black.
After the end of their performance, they go to their room and wipe the
color off and you see the same black face. I like this, this is crucial.
Let me go on. Nonetheless I have other things to ask you. Okay, what
you said about social democracy and so on. I think just a general
remark, I’m sorry, it’s out of order but I cannot resist making it. What
is social democracy? How times are changing. Today in Greece we have
Syriza, which is in European media decried as leftist lunatics, but if
you look closely I know him, he’s my friend Tsipras, what he demands
from Europe, it’s something that forty, fifty years ago would not have
been even extreme but extremely moderate social democracy. In what sad
times do we live that what fifty years, forty ago was an extremely
moderate social democracy, now you have to be radical left, if you—sad
times, but that’s another point.
Now I go to a little bit defense not really of Bolshevism, I just
want to provoke you when you said communism, nations, and so on—but
whatever you say about Lenin, that’s my impression, you can correct me,
at one point he was sincere in his hatred of big Russian nationalism. He
even had I think Lenin a debate with Rosa Luxembourg, I simplify the
debate but you can correct me, if I am remembering correctly it went
like this, all these small nations, precisely the ones you mentioned,
from Poland to Baltic states, they should be given a real choice, if
they want to go their own way, full independence, they get it. Now Rosa
Luxemburg tried to play a little bit communist trick, she said, “No, no,
let’s specify it only if the right guys are in power there, no?” And
Lenin correctly said no, whoever is in power there, and he did this,
Lenin.
Second thing with Ukraine, now I will say something horrible but from
what I know it’s true, you can correct me again if I’m wrong. Isn’t it
that under czarist regime Ukraine was not recognized as a nation and so
on? There was no—the golden era of Ukraine, golden era not for freedom
but in the simple sense of establishing their autonomous, you know, like
culture, lexicons, how you call them, grammar and so on. It was the
twenties, it was the twenties. So Stalin’s countercoup against
Ukrainians, it was basically taking away from them not what they always
possessed, even in czarist regime, but what they gained in the twenties.
So don’t you think that at least at this point the original Bolsheviks
were half sincere, because as you know better than me, even Lenin, his
first conflict with some guys from Georgia was precisely how far to go
in allowing, don’t you think that there at least Lenin was serious?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Okay, so—
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Did I say too much? Hit back.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Lenin was very serious. He played for keeps, he was for real. Unfortunately, Lenin was a very large personality.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: What do you mean by this? Like not Mahatma Gandhi large soul but—
STEPHEN KOTKIN: I don’t think we would have had
October seizure of power, Bolshevik coup without Lenin and I don’t think
we would have Stalin without Lenin either.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Unfortunately I have to agree with the second part.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: So, you know, on the nationality
question. So the revolution happens in Eurasia, it happens in the former
Russian empire. So this, of course, is a tremendously difficult
proposition. What to do about this? You have a revolution based upon a
class principle. The proletariat is the universal class, but then you
have all these nations and the proletariat speaks all these languages.
So what are you going to do? It turns out that Lenin didn’t really know
much about these questions. Lenin was not an expert on nationalities nor
on Russia. Lenin didn’t travel much. He never was in Georgia, he didn’t
go through Ukraine. Lenin knew Zurich very well. The Dada Café was a
few doors down the street from Lenin’s residence in Zurich. He knew
Finland a tiny bit and of course he knew—
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: London, a tiny little bit.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: He knew Central Russia a little
where he was born, and he knew Kazan where he failed to complete his law
degree. But Lenin was not a person of Russian Eurasia the way Stalin
was. Stalin had significantly deeper knowledge about Russian Eurasia
because he was from the periphery of the empire. And he traveled much
more widely through the empire than Lenin ever did. Stalin was an exile
in Russia and Lenin was an exile in Europe. And many people hold this
against Stalin, that he didn’t know Europe, that he was not as smart as
Lenin, that he was ignorant, but actually it turned out to be an
advantage when they were having a revolution in Russian Eurasia. It was
one of the things I hope the book shows, that was an advantage for
Stalin in the power struggle.
Now, it’s a very complicated story of how they got the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, what Lenin’s ideas were, what Stalin’s ideas
were, whether they differed or not on these questions. These have been
very fraught in the literature and they certainly wanted to bring a
better Lenin, a more flexible Lenin on this. You compared him to Rosa
Luxemburg and she was certainly in complete denial of the importance of
nations, in complete denial. Luxemburgism was the extreme on the left,
and Lenin was much more flexible, willing to allow, once again, tactical
retreats, willing to allow a certain amount of concession to
nationalism in pursuit of the larger goal, which of course is world
revolution.
Stalin was a little bit more practical than Lenin and they had a
fight. Stalin wanted to form a single state. He wanted to fold—what
happened was when the Russian empire collapsed in World War I, the
revolution, and civil war, these new states or statelets formed.
Ukraine, Belorussia, Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, they
had not existed in the czarist empire. They had been only provinces in
the czarist empire. There was no Ukraine in the czarist empire. But the
circumstances of the dissolution because of World War I and the
revolution produced these states on the map. They were not stable, they
were fragile, but they existed.
Stalin’s idea was to fold them all back into Russia and create a
unitary state. They would have autonomy, as he called it, in many
policies, but they would be part of Soviet Russia, part of Russia once
again. Lenin initially agreed to this view, and then Lenin changed his
mind and demanded that instead of folding into Russia they would be
joined in a union of republics, and Russia and Ukraine and Belorussia
and the Caucuses would be equal members of this union. And Stalin said,
“That’s unfair. What about the Tatars. Tatarstan is inside Russia
already. How come they don’t have the same status as Ukraine, which
would become a union republic equal to Russia in the Union of Soviet
Socialist—” And they fought, but Lenin was Lenin and so Stalin conceded
Lenin’s point, and he formed—Lenin was sick already—Stalin formed the
USSR. He did it and it was Lenin’s version of how to deal with
revolution in Russian Eurasia.
Well, what happens? 1991 comes along. The Soviet Union dissolves and
it dissolves into these Leninist constituent republics. The parts that
were folded into Russia are still in Russia, and so this is one of the
reasons that Stalin is in good standing these days compared to Lenin,
because Lenin was much more responsible than Stalin for the possibility
that the Soviet Union could be dissolved into its constituent members
because it was made up of constituent members. As the final analyst of
the KGB, Nikolai Leonov, has said, the KGB obviously ended formally in
1991 when the Soviet Union was dissolved. He said the Soviet Union was
like a chocolate bar, like one of those Hershey bars which has the
creases in it, and you see the little blocks, and they’re all tied
together but you see where the creases are and you break it off and you
give some to this person—
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Did the KGB analyst use the example of Hershey bar?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Yes, this was his metaphor.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Hershey bar, not just chocolate?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Actually, just chocolate bar.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Just chocolate! Too nice to be true. Sorry. Sorry.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: You really don’t like to disappoint,
but, you know, facts are very stubborn. Sometimes the stories could get
better if you were a novelist at the Cullman Center as opposed to a
historian.
But anyway so these pieces got broken off and Kazakhstan got a piece
of the chocolate bar and Ukraine got a piece of the chocolate bar and
you ended up with these union republics being the successor states to
the USSR, whereas Tatarstan, as we said, was still—and many others like
Tatarstan were inside Russia and remain inside Russia. So in the end the
answer to your question is, you know, Lenin had tactical flexibility on
the national question but not a difference in principle and his form
and Stalin’s form were different and Stalin had to concede or felt he
had to concede to Lenin’s form. If you examine the others, Zinoviev was a
complete nincompoop on this question—
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Complete—
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Complete idiot on this question.
Kominev followed Stalin, but then when Lenin came out with his view,
Kominev and Stalin—So, you know, Lenin he was for real on communist
revolution and that meant that if you had to concede something to the
ethnic, to the nationalities, to the ethnicities now because later you
could overcome that some way, you should do it.
Now let’s remember it was Lenin in 1919, 1920 who forced the invasion
of Poland to try to bring Poland back into the fold, to try to retake
Poland, reconquer Poland with the Red Army, and Stalin said, you know,
“I’m not sure we can do this, it may not work.” And it failed and Poland
defeated the Red Army and remained an independent state unfortunately
up to the Hitler/Stalin pact, August 1939, September 1939 Hitler invaded
one side, Stalin the other. But until that point Poland had won its
independence and Stalin was the skeptic. He believed nationalism was for
real. It was Stalin in the 1920s who got up at the tenth Party Congress
in 1921 and said, “Ukraine is a real nation.” It was Stalin who said
that. This is one of the chapters in the book. You know, so history is
crazy that way. It turns out that Lenin’s tactical flexibility was a
little bit too flexible for those who are ruling Russia today.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Okay, let me provoke you with another
friendly aggressive—Nonetheless, you know, Poles like to emphasize this
yes, Red Army wanted to crush us in in—but wait a minute, Poles
themselves are not so innocent here. Remember that a year before Polish
army occupied practically all of Ukraine. What were they doing there?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: They were occupying Ukraine, like you said.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Yeah, that’s what you know.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: You’re right.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: So it’s not just innocent Poland oh and then you know.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Interwar Poland was a nasty regime, a very nasty regime, an extremely nasty regime.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: That’s what I wanted to bring out of you, yeah.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Polish history portrays—often
portrays Poland solely as a victim. Poland was victimized but they were
also perpetrators, there’s no question. I wouldn’t put them on the same
plane necessarily with Stalin in this regard. But I would not have
wanted to live under the Piłsudski regime in interwar Poland, absolutely
not, that was not a friendly, nice regime.
You know but in the long sweep of things, right, you have a problem.
Here you have a book that ends in 1928, the decision to collectivize
agriculture. And it makes sense. The guy is not psychopathic in his
tendencies and behavior yet. They’re arguing about ideas. He’s
exercising a lot of power, et cetera, but you can feel like you
understand this person. There’s a human being in there. And there are
all sorts of complicated questions that would have been complicated for
anybody who was ruling Russia at the time. The foreign policy would not
have been simple for any kind of regime and the peasant countryside
stuff would have been difficult even if you accepted the markets because
there were many peculiar aspects to the Russian countryside even under a
market economy.
But then, you see, I get into volume II, which covers the period 1929
to 1941 and it’s much harder, you see, because he crashed the plane.
The plane was flying fine. There were no mechanical difficulties. All
the people on the plane were loyal and he drove it into the Alps just
like happened the other day and he smashed it and how do you explain
that? How do you explain that Stalin who has so much power already, so
much power, he’s already collectivized agriculture, he’s eradicated
capitalism. He declares socialism is built in its foundations in 1936.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: By crashing the plane you mean great purges, concerning the Party itself.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: And then everybody starts to be
murdered. All the people who were loyal, his closest friends and
advisers, people who are the heads of all the factories, the heads of
all the collective farms, his diplomats, his foreign intelligence
officers, his Red Army officer corps. A hundred and fifty out of 180
division commanders are executed as spies for foreign countries. None of
these guys had done anything. They commanded 12,000, 15,000, 20,000
troops. They didn’t cross the border with their troops and betray the
country by fleeing. They didn’t march on the capital to try to do a
coup. They were loyal and he murdered them. And he murdered not just a
few.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: I know.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: He murdered big numbers. So we’re
talking about the 1920s and it makes so much sense to me, and then I’m
thinking, you know, he crashed the plane and where did that come from.
Where did that demonic? Where did those demons inside him, those snakes
in his head, where did that come from.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Now I will give you a Varoufakis. You
know in what sense. I agree with you but here you should also speak to
your wonderful principle it’s politics. Don’t bring me in a too simple
way personality now. I think this is still in a crazy way that I don’t
understand but my gut feeling is the horror of the 1930s it’s still a
political process. It’s not simply then demonic personality entered and
so on.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: So Hitler doesn’t murder his officer
corps. When Hitler wants to remove the highest level officers in the
Wehrmacht, he retires them, and he retires them with honors, and he does
it in 1938, the year Stalin is cutting through like a scythe his
officer corps. And Hitler doesn’t murder his diplomats, and he doesn’t
murder his foreign intelligence agents, and he doesn’t murder the
Gauleiter or the provincial Nazi officials, and he doesn’t murder the
factory bosses. There’s the Night of the Long Knives in 1934.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Yeah, but that’s the beginning.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Fewer than a hundred people are
killed in the Night of the Long Knives. There are execution lists that
Stalin signed that have thousands of names on them, with his signature,
recognized signature on them, for a single night. And so this becomes a
more difficult proposition. How you get from the Stalin who is managing
to build a personal dictatorship to the Stalin who’s going to crash the
plane onto the side of the mountain when it’s fully functional?
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Do you know the book—I like it, I want now from you as the one who knows to tell me am I right or not. Naumov, Getty, The Road to Terror.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Yes of course we know that book.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Does it have its weaknesses, or what
is your opinion of that book? Because maybe I’m wrong but for me it’s
the best book that I know of.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: People are trying to explain the
terror as a rational response to conditions that were there that Stalin
was trying to overcome. So there was resistance to his directives on the
part of local officials and therefore they all were killed. And so I
haven’t seen a dictatorship in which there wasn’t resistance, a
circumvention, ignoring of decrees from the center. All dictatorships
are like that. But not all dictatorships murder their loyal elites. So
I’m not sure the Getty/Naumov book really explains what we’ve got here.
Now, having said that, I do agree with you that there’s something
about having that kind of power, having life-or-death power over two
hundred million people, because that’s what Stalin has by the 1930s.
Very few people have ever had power like that before or since, just a
tiny handful, and that, of course, is going to affect his personality.
But still he’s murdering them and receiving reports that he’s unhinged
the economy. There are 138 days in 1937 and ’38 where he gets no foreign
intelligence reports. He’s been getting several every day for years and
they have his pencil marks on them. A hundred and thirty-eight days
blind. No foreign intelligence. He had the best foreign intelligence
network the world has ever seen. And after 138 days he doesn’t stop
murdering them. This is really perplexing, I gotta tell you. It’s not
easy to figure this out.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: No, I totally agree.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: And where this comes from and how
this is possible. You know? This is the problem in the Stalin
biographies and the Stalin literature. Once you get to this point then
you have to find the answer somewhere before, and so you begin to look
for things he did when he was younger and blow them up and connect them
to this later behavior. “Aha, when he put the cat in the microwave, I
knew, I knew right then, that he was going to murder us all.” Aha. And
so we have this retrospective finding of these behaviors which weren’t
considered that crazy, abnormal, demented, or psychopathic at the time.
And I’m very close in following what people said not thirty, forty,
fifty years later but at the time.
And so not to go too far with this, but in analyzing evil, in trying
to describe evil, and in humanizing evil, because evil is much worse
when it’s humanized, then you can really understand it. Historians need
explanation. Shakespeare can have Iago and nobody’s there on the dais,
“Jeez, you know, Shakespeare, how did he get evil, what was it?” He’s
just evil. Evil is just evil, that’s it. That’s just how Iago behaves.
And nobody’s asking him questions. Can you please explain this? Can you
relate this to his relationship with his mother or, you know, what, did a
teacher humiliate Iago in school? What was it? But in history people
are expecting explanation for this type of behavior and if the
explanation is rooted in politics it could be, but I gotta tell you it
didn’t happen in other cases when dictatorial politics were similar so I
don’t know how much we can exclude the demonic personality from the
explanation. Although we’ll see, I mean Volume II, I’m still putting the
final touches on this thing.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: You got it how my friend Stephen did,
he began with the book ends perplexed, his answer was you want the
answer to the mystery of book one, buy volume two, no? That was the
complete story. That was evil. I wanted to tell you a much more serious
question now.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: You know, I thought I was being subtle. But I wasn’t. I gotta do better.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: More seriously I liked very much what
you said about comparing Stalinism and fascism. And I say this again as a
radical leftist. It always when people just throw them together into
the same category of totalitarianism, I agree there are good reasons for
it, but the whole functioning of the system was different. Let’s take
the most extreme example of Stalinism, the purges. Why this compulsion
to have people, victims accused, publicly admit, confess, you know,
Bukharin and so on, confess their sins? You cannot imagine the same
thing in Nazi Germany. It would have been meaningless within the Nazi
universe to organize a big trial against the Jews where the Jewish
leader would confess to their plot against Germany, it’s not a part of
their universe.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: What would be the comparison would
be Himmler and Heydrich and Goering confessing to being Soviet spies in
public and then being executed for that. That would be the equivalent of
what happened in Stalin’s—
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: But again as you said, that doesn’t happen there.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: It’s unimaginable.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Another thing. I read in Anne
Applebaum’s gulag book, even in the darkest terror period up to early
fifties when Stalin was still alive, she writes about this, I hope it’s
true, I don’t have any other means to check it up, once a year on
Stalin’s birthday all the prisoners were collected and had to sign
collectively a telegram—gulag prisoners to Stalin, wishing him. You
cannot imagine Nazi collecting all the Jews in Auschwitz to send a
telegram to Hitler.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: I’ll give you that. You’ve got something there.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Now, my explanation is a very sad one.
That’s the perverted remainder of enlightenment. In Stalinism you can
be the lowest trash, vermin, shit, but at the same time part of you
participates in universal reason, and of course it’s all staged, I know
that, but you know the universe of Stalinism is still a crazy universe
of again universal enlightenment where even the lowest roadside trash
can be forced to participate in this universal true freedom. Nazism is a
different universe, but now the last question and then maybe we should
admit the fact which I will never admit within myself is that we not
alone, that there are other people here.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: That’s big of you.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Do you also agree with me that and
again I’m sympathizing still radical leftist but that to understand
really Stalinism one has to demystify stop with this especially in
cultural circles it’s popular this idolatry of the twenties. Golden era,
formalists, futurists, relative freedom, everything. It’s not as simple
as that. Especially, you know, some very strange things were going on,
which are in their ideological potentials maybe in a way even more
ominous than Stalinism. I’ve written about this in my books. You know,
the so-called I cannot call it otherwise gnostic Bolshevism. There was a
strong movement, Trotsky even subscribed to it. I have quotes where he
says, “the next big task of Soviet power is to construct a new man,” and
he means it quite literally biologically. A new man who would be much
more rational. Ultimately, there was a very strong school in the
twenties which even said, claimed, sex is a bourgeois invention,
basically. You know, this kind of—
So what I’m saying is that twenties is a period to be rediscovered.
We have to stop with this simple idolatry. Only in this way we can
understand, strange as this may sound, maybe we’ll agree, the even
relative popularity, relative because of his manipulation, of you know
when Stalin introduced socialist realism. People were glad finally we
will literature with normal suffering, crying people, enough of those
stupid formalist experiments, and so on and so on. So I think would you
agree a new look is needed upon these glorified twenties?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: You know, there was a revolution,
and it was real. The revolution was widespread, mass participatory. It
was the biggest revolution in world history to date. The Chinese
revolution would happen later, obviously. And the belief, the hopes, the
utopia, the building of a new world, the idea that the injustice and
czarist oppression was severe, the czarist regime was unjust. The
revolution was because of very good reasons, and thank God they
overthrew the czarist regime. The revolution was fantastic, and it
spawned a tremendous amount of dynamism and energy and craziness.
Unfortunately what happens in a revolution is the brilliant ideas
don’t take over. What takes over are the institutions. The shards of the
old regime become the building blocks of the new regime. Protest
movements, massing in the streets, forming communes, chiliastic songs,
this doesn’t get you a parliament, an independent judiciary, an
impartial civil service, a free and open media space. These have to be
built. Institutions have to be built, and instead of building free and
open institutions during the 1920s, they build this dictatorship. And
it’s on purpose; it’s not an accident. It’s not something circumstances
caused. It was something that Lenin wanted. And it was something that
Lenin and Stalin and the rest of them were able to implant.
Now, you could argue that they were doing it because they were trying
to create a new world, they were trying to overcome the injustices of
the old world, and that’s correct, that was their motivation. They were
not cynics, they were not just out for personal power. They were not
just killing people for the sake of killing people in some type of
sadistic orgy. This was a revolution to bring about a new world. The
institutions to bring about the new world were in conflict with the
goals. The methods and the core ideas of the reigning communists could
never bring the freedom and the abundance and the happiness that the
revolution had been about.
This is a very tragic story. And the 1920s are very tragic, and
Russian history unfortunately is a tragic story. Time and again, you
know, they try to build something which is better, and unfortunately
they haven’t made it yet but the attempts were sincere although
misguided in my view. Now so when you talk about the 1920s the reason
the 1920s look like a great period of pluralism and relative freedom is
because the 1930s came after that, and if you were alive in the
twenties, you weren’t alive in the thirties, and so the twenties was a
kind of golden era, so I understand that psychologically. But your
point, your point about the 1920s being some open, free society that was
going somewhere nice, that’s obviously not true, you’re absolutely
correct that that was not the case.
You know, on the gulag question, and we could talk for a long time
about this, the forced labor camps or so-called gulag, it’s very
interesting because not only did they write the letters to Stalin on his
birthday. Actually, most of them didn’t write the letters because
somebody was there writing it for them in communist style but they had a
New Year’s Eve masquerade, and they would have dancers and they would
have theater directors and you know half the Bolshoi troupe was there in
the gulag dancing for the fat-fingered, thick-necked gulag commandant
and his wife who were in some Arctic Circle but had assembled the
talent, and the photographer who took pictures of the evening and then
sent it, whether it was the New Year’s Eve masquerade ball or it was the
May Day parade or the revolution parade, there were gulag photo albums
by the hundreds of these events where the cultural intelligentsia was in
the gulag. But there were no orchestras.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: The difference from Auschwitz, where they get orchestra.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: You could go to any Nazi camp and
you could get an orchestra that would put to shame anything we’ve got
here in New York, but you couldn’t do that in the gulag because Stalin
loved music too much and he didn’t allow the musicians, especially the
vocalists, to be arrested. Instead he wanted them to perform for them.
And so these are the kind—I mean, the personality actually begins to
have a stamp on history that is just so large. You go to the gulag
archive, which is in a gigantic Corbusier building in Moscow. You go to
the secret floor, the formerly secret floor, you go to the back wall
where they have the folios and the quartos, because the stuff is too big
to put on a regular shelf, and it’s gulag photo albums. You know,
“Vorkuta, New Year’s Eve, 1949, prima ballerina,” et cetera, and that’s
what the camps looked like. If you’ve got your cultural elite in a labor
camp, the revolution didn’t work out. Right? The chiliastic build a new
world 1917 revolution, something has gone amiss, right, if this is
where you’ve ended up.
Maybe some of these people weren’t that talented, maybe their talent
was overrated. Maybe some of the people who served the regime, their
talent was underrated. I agree with you on that. Some of the socialist
realist paintings are well done. They are. Some of the orchestral music
that’s produced is better than the music that was produced in the 1920s
or before. And you could go on. Some of the architecture is stirring,
effective. You know, so we have to be careful about wonderful culture,
evil culture, the dichotomy that you’ve got going on. But the overall
trajectory is deeply tragic, fundamentally tragic.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: And I like the term “tragic” here in
the sense that—sorry here now my last remainders of communism will come
out. I would like to insist on the term “tragic.” As you beautifully
said, it was whatever you say, a revolution against czarism a tremendous
explosion of hope and it went terribly wrong. This is why, this is
another difference between Nazism and Stalinism. You have many
dissidents who claim Stalin betrayed communism. I don’t think you have
many Nazis who claim Hitler betrayed authentic Nazism or whatever, it’s a
different logic.
But to conclude before I hope we give over to them I want to play the
last Stalinist trick on you and what? You know, one of the stylistic
characteristics of Stalin’s writings—you must know it better than me is
that he likes to ask a question and then answer it himself. Like, What
are comrades the problems of economy today? Comrades, the problems of
economy today are—” So to give you the last chance is there a question
that modeling upon the greatest genius of humanity, Stalin, you would
like to ask yourself and then answer? Do you have a question like that?
Are you ready to live up to Comrade Stalin? Quite seriously. What this
means in more normal terms is do you think, do you feel that we missed
any crucial point that has to be made?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: You know, the question I’d like to ask myself is how did I get on this stage?
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: How to get off the stage?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: How did I get here? I was a decent, normal kid.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Off the stage. How to get off the stage? Very simple, nominate me minister of the interior, you are in gulag next day.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: I grew up a regular, lower
middle-class, working-class household, and, you know I should have had
that kind of life. You know, I came home—
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: But you have that kind of life. You are a professor writing books. You have that kind of life, don’t you?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Yeah, you know, I’m not sure it’s the same kind of life.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: This doubt is part of lower middle class.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Let’s think about this. I came home,
it was like first or second grade. And I told my mom that, you know,
there was this play and I had a part.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Which play?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: It was a school play, first or
second grade, who knows what it was? And I told my mom and she was, “Oh,
you’re going to be in a play at school?” And she was just melting with
emotion about this and then it dawns on her to ask like what’s the part
I’m going to play? And I said, “I’m the Jewish husband,” and she says,
“Damn it. I was hoping you were going to get a speaking part.”
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: So as a reaction you write now big fat books to—
STEPHEN KOTKIN: How did I get here? I fell out of
the station wagon on the ride to school and bonked my head and now
somehow I’m writing three volumes on Stalin, not to be a psychoanalyst.
Do we go to audience questions at this point? What’s the protocol? Is
there someone from the leadership? Paul? I think.
PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER: The leadership is coming up. What
you will do here is you will come up and ask a question, which will be
about forty seconds long and which has to be good, so please come up.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: This is bourgeois liberalism. In Stalinist times, you know how you did this? You distribute the questions in advance among the—
STEPHEN KOTKIN: We’ll hear some of those too I hope. Yes, sir.
Q: Mr. Kotkin. You said you tried to write more
about history and not just focus on Stalin alone. And so my question is
in this vein. A few days ago I read a credo by Isaiah Berlin who tried
in this credo to explain how he understands tragedy of twentieth century
of all those totalitarian regimes and I wonder if you agree with his
explanation. He says that it usually starts as somebody has an idea of
how to bring paradise onto earth, then they try building it and it
always fails. The cause is that people’s ideals are mutually in
conflict. So what do you think about his?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Do you want to try that one, Isaiah Berlin?
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: It was addressed to you.
Come on, that’s right up your alley, Isaiah Berlin.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: You know, there is something about
the twentieth century and these regimes that we hope we don’t see again
and that there is a large number of phenomena that come together to
produce them. But you know it’s too simple. You see, you have World War I
and World War I destroys the old order. Moreover, the generals send
millions to their deaths, knowing that they’re maybe going to get a
couple of inches, move the trench a little bit farther over.
And this sacrifice of the flower of Europe for a little bit of
movement, one trench over to the next trench, this is a lesson for
Lenin. Lenin says, “You know, if the old regimes, if the generals are
going to kill people for no good reason, at least we can sacrifice
people to build a better world than the world that they have.” And so
you can’t just pin it on bad people, you can’t just pin it on ideas,
even, Lenin. You have a conjuncture. You have a conjuncture which is
produced by World War I. A historical conjuncture. And this historical
conjuncture makes possible use of violence on a mass scale in everyday
politics and it produces Lenin, it produces Mussolini, it produces
Hitler, and it produces World War II.
And so you’ve got to talk about the origins of World War I and what
World War I does to civilization and political systems and then add in
some of the things that Isaiah Berlin is talking about and then you’re
kind of off to the races.
You know, Lenin was a hard man, a very hard man, but I’ve gotta tell
you, Lenin was a product of imperial Russia. Lenin’s hard line, his deep
hard line against freedom was the way he thought you had to battle the
fact that there was no freedom, no politics, in imperial Russia. So
imperial Russia has a lot to say for producing a guy like Lenin, just as
World War I has a lot to say for producing these terrible regimes and
these terrible tragedies, you know, so in that sense, the wider history
or the context is something that’s laid out in my book and where I try
to get to the larger explanation that you’re asking for.
Q: Are there any good worthwhile or illuminating fictional depictions of the Soviet system and if not why are there so few?
STEPHEN KOTKIN: That’s for you for sure.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: I will make a provocation and I wonder
if you would agree. I always like—you know, I don’t like westerns from
the fifties which get psychological, you don’t know who is a good—I like
westerns where you know who is good guy, who is bad guy. So I will give
you two names to provoke you also, Solzhenitsyn versus Varlam Shalamov.
I almost hate Solzhenitsyn for this verbosity, deep moralilzing. If you
want to get the raw taste of what gulag is, read Varlam Shalamov’s Kolyma Tales. It think it’s endlessly superior to this endless moralizing of Solzhenitsyn and so on. Again, do Varlam Shalamov.
If you want to get at the roots, the twenties, the potentially, to
use your terms, demonic side of the twenties read the one who is and
it’s now more and more recognized among my Russian friends, the greatest
Soviet Russian author of the twentieth century, Andrei Platonov, his Foundation Pit
and so on, there you have. He saw before Stalinism he saw where there
is some terrifying nihilistic dimension in it. So I would say these are
two of my favorite names in fiction, pure fiction, Andrei Platonov,
especially his great novels but also his short stories, there are some
wonderful movies even made from them and Varlam Shalamov.
Q: How about Vasily Grossman?
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: I appreciate, I like him deeply but
I’m sorry to tell you this, it will disappoint you. For me he’s way too
soft humanist. In his very approach it’s something missing to grasp what
you called the truly demonic side of Stalinism. You cannot do it—he was
too kind a man. I want to say this in a way. This is not a criticism.
You must have like Platonov a certain almost madness in yourself to get
it, although again I have a great, almost infinite respectful feeling
for Vasily Grossman, but the other more interesting point would have
been.
So here I would agree with you, it’s not simply black and white
image. Take someone like Sholokhov, yes, the official Soviet guy, but
you know that he nonetheless in the early thirties he protested to
Stalin against the horrors. He was almost—so you know you have almost
official big writers who nonetheless had the minimum of honor so let me
end with another provocation. Let’s face it, Quietly Flows the Don is a better novel than Dr. Zhivago. Dr. Zhivago is for me not such a great novel. Pasternak is a wonderful, great poet whatever you want.
You know, one should have the courage to distinguished even among
great dissident figures. Like this is my personal taste and we will
probably violently disagree, but for me Osip Mandelstam and Marina
Tsvetaeva are infinitely superior to Anna Akhmatova, who is an endlessly
pretentious bitch. She has this complex, I am the mother of all Russia,
I speak for all Russia. Fuck you. Mandelstam is my hero. But that’s my
opinion. You’re allowed, temporarily, the two of us we are in the
twenties I’m not yet full Stalin, I allow you.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: I think we’ll let your judgment stand. I think we’ll leave it at that.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Does this mean like Lenin on nationality, for the time being strategic retreat?
STEPHEN KOTKIN:Yes.
Q: Hi. I’m actually Georgian.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Oh my God.
Q: Probably the only Georgian in this space.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Are you also—I met a Georgian friend
who told me I’m a distant relative unfortunately not of Stalin but of
Beria. You have no connection.
Q: Well, my name is [inaudible]. My
great-grandfather was executed in 1937 so my connection to the events,
but myself I am not much on the right from Luxembourg. My question is
you know it was a very historicist discussion and to kind of bring it to
a little bit of structuralist points. You elaborated a lot on Stalinism
as being related to the kind of a perverted discourse and in this way
and especially when you expand on his denial of negation of negation,
and real and void, cut.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: You’re talking to me now.
Q: Yeah, yeah. History is beautifully written, it’s
very funny to talk about history. You know to bring it Stalinism is
maybe not dead, right, like they say fascism is not dead, maybe
Stalinism is also not dead so how do you see with this denial of the
real, denial of the cut and the void, do you see Stalinism kind of
living on in this poststructuralist vitalist illusion BS that we live in
in terms of left.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: You know there is a great irony at
work in the fact that maybe Fukuyama has won, liberal democracy, but
isn’t it the irony that those communists who are still in power but who
are not like just lunatics like North Korea and so on and incidentally
North Koreans don’t even call them now communists. People didn’t notice
it. A couple of years ago North Korea changed their constitution, no
mention of communism, just a patriotic military. But what I want to say
those communists who are still in power, China, Vietnam, and so on, are
more and more appearing as the most efficient managers of global
capitalism, you know. Sometimes more efficient than in democracies, and
that’s what really worries me, but that’s a topic not for today. Again
as I always repeat it, the problem is that for me global capitalism is
approaching a stage where maybe it less and less needs democracy. If it
needs it, it’s more and more a kind of empty, purely ritualized
democracy, so that’s all I can say now not to go into it.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Paul, can we take one more question
and I can do some of the slides, I can talk about some of the slides if
there’s interest in talking about the slides or no?
(applause)
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: Is there any sex in the slides? No sex.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: You can provide that.
Q: The question will be brief. Now that Stalin gets
extreme popularity in the period of Soviet and Bolshevik tyranny and now
for example he gathers such a pull that you personally I think wouldn’t
be able to create without him. So does it mean that very soon, after
the end of Putin’s tyranny, the soft tyranny, we’ll get the new wave of
reopening twenties as you call it and the interest to Lenin. Like maybe
Russia with human face.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK: I would love to see it but I doubt it.
But I agree with you that wasn’t there a mega-opinion poll all
academics in Russia a couple of years ago the greatest personality of
all Russian history and I think Stalin ended third but not with a great
distance after the first two. The first was Alexander Nevsky I think but
nowhere in sight was Lenin.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: You look very much like Dmitry Bykov, the famous Russian writer.
Q: Thank you very much. I am a great fan of Lenin and I hate Stalin, that’s normal.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Okay. Paul could we have the slides
and I could go through them if that would be okay briefly. Could you go a
little bit faster so we can get to the start? I don’t know, I won’t do
much because let’s see. You can comment also because I think we can see
them. All right that one. Unretouched photograph, 1927. The
Russo-Japanese war, that’s unfortunately the Russian navy going down.
That’s the guy who caused the war in some ways but also got them out of
it, Sergei Witte, the first prime minister of Russia. That’s the first
parliament meeting. These are all from the glass-plate negatives, that’s
Nicholas II on the throne. This guy saved the Russian regime in 1906,
the interior minister, Pyotr Durnovo, That’s Stolypin in the white
jacket, directly behind Nicholas II, he’s the great prime minister,
that’s his dacha, he’s about to be assassinated, unfortunately.
That’s European royalty. That’s the queen. That’s the czarevich, a
hemophiliac, they don’t let him down because if he bumps into a tree
he’ll die of—that’s Stalin’s father, that’s Stalin’s mother, the other
Georgians in the room. That’s Stalin’s birth hovel, before Beria built a
gigantic monument over it. That’s the guy who paid for Stalin’s
education, he owned the tavern and was the head wrestler in town. That’s
the first photograph of Stalin, center middle, he’s about ten, twelve
years old, you see the attitude. That’s Stalin in the seminary, second
from the left on the top, beardless. That’s the seminary building,
neoclassical, that’s where Stalin studied to be a priest. That’s the guy
who taught Stalin Marxism, Lado Ketskhoveli, fellow Georgian, he died
young. That’s Stalin’s only job, the observatory, he was a weatherman,
he went out, took the weather, and went back in.
That’s Stalin’s prison cell, his first major prison cell,
unfortunately they let him out. That’s his first wife, who died of
disease and that’s Stalin in the corner there, that’s from the Georgian
police archive. This is Stalin from the czarist police archive, 1910.
This is Sarajevo, there’s the archduke, he’s about to turn and he’s
about to be shot in the head, and this is the guy who’s about to shoot
him, Princip, Gavrilo Princip, started World War I, helped bring Stalin
to power. That’s Stalin’s Siberian—Three years in Siberia during World
War I, eight houses, sixty-seven people on the Arctic Circle, that’s him
in the back with the hat on in Siberia.
This is the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army who was the
right-wing hope in 1917. That’s Aleksandr Kerensky, he blew it big-time.
That guy we’ve referred to often, he played for keeps. You can see
that. That’s Kshesinskaia, the ballerina, this was Bolshevik
headquarters, they evicted her and ruined the furniture. That’s the
outside of Kshesinskaia’s mansion across from the Winter Palace, this is
where the revolution came from. This is the only photograph of the
seizure of power. That’s Lenin at the podium saying that we’ve seized
power. That’s Martov, the head of the Mensheviks, he had left the hall
at this time already unfortunately. That’s the first Bolshevik
government. There’s Lenin, and there’s Stalin with his hand on his face
against the wall. Spiridonova, she had the Bolsheviks in July 1918 and
let them go she could have murdered them all. This is from Stalin’s
personal photo album, that’s his wife Nadya one year before he married
her. This is Trotsky all in leather, the civil war hero, the rare
photograph that was preserved of Trotsky. This is Sokolnikov, the
finance minister that I was referring to in the book. That’s Lazar
Kaganovich. This is the guy who took over Mongolia, Ungern-Sternberg and
made it the first Soviet satellite.
That’s the civil war, this shows you that the revolution was for
real, those bayonets. This is the famine 1921 to 1923 in Volgograd,
which is going to be named Stalingrad a few years later. Stalin and
Lenin, famous picture only never published because Stalin was looking
too much like Napoleon and so they suppressed that photo. This is him in
1923. That’s Lenin you can see the dementia late in life that’s his
doctor and his nurse. This is Lenin’s funeral, you can see Stalin in the
hat, January 1924. This is the death mask, Lenin’s death mask, it ended
up in Stalin’s office, that’s all you needed to know about the
succession struggle. This is Stalin’s first book about Lenin, the famous
book on Leninism, you can see the iconography of the twenties. That’s
Stalin’s office, Old Square #4, the whole right-hand side, that’s the
commissariat of foreign affairs, which Stalin controlled. That’s
Trotsky’s office. That’s the commissariat of the military, the war
commissariat of the navy, right here, the old Alexander Military School.
That’s the original secret police building before it was refurbished.
That’s Stalin’s inner secretariat, the people who ran his
dictatorship. It looks like a Berkeley commune. That’s the military guys
and Stalin. You can see him right here, his left elbow doesn’t move.
That’s Felix Dzerzhinsky, the head of the secret police, he was dying of
tuberculosis for many years, that’s his funeral. This is Alexei Rykov,
the guy I was talking about, the number two person in the regime. That’s
Menjinsky, one of Stalin’s agents in the secret police, painted his
fingernails red. Yagoda, another secret policeman, these are all
Stalin’s minions inside the regime now. Artuzov the guy who hated Yagoda
and Stalin used their animosity against them. This is the guy who faked
the first major fake trial. This is Zinoviev, a caricature, how he’s
playing with the kulak and the NEP man. This is Kirov, Stalin replaced
Zinoviev with Kirov, his closest friends. This is the three musketeers,
Mikoyan, Stalin, and Orjonikidze in the Caucuses on holiday retouched.
This is Stalin’s apartment, seventeenth-century Boyar residence, the
only seventeenth-century residence in the Kremlin, that’s where his wife
shot herself. That’s Stalin’s dacha, that’s Stalin’s son, Vasily, and
his son’s friend, Artyom. That’s Stalin’s wife, second wife Nadya and
that’s little Svetlana. That’s Yakov, Stalin’s son from his first wife.
That’s the woman who ran Stalin’s household, Carolina Till and that’s
Svetlana’s nanny, Bychkova.
That’s Josef Pilsudski on a visit to Romania. That’s Chiang Kai-shek,
he betrayed Stalin and got the better of him in the 1920s but Stalin
stuck with him. That’s the Red Army on bicycles, Stalin had no tanks in
1927. That’s Stalin, you can see the charisma standing out in the crowd.
This is the military attachés, all the enemies of the Soviet Union,
they’re lined up on the May Day Parade. This is Stalin in Siberia when
he goes to collectivize agriculture. That’s how he got to the meeting,
he got to the meeting in this. He’s going to collectivize a hundred
million peasants. That’s the fabricated Shakhty trial, 1928, the
fabricated, that’s the announcement of the verdict and the foreign
journalists about how these wreckers destroyed industry and that’s the
kulak, the leather versus the Bass sandals. That’s Bukharin, caricature
of Stalin. So anyway, those are the photos.
PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER: I think that just about wraps it up. Thank you very much.
STEPHEN KOTKIN: Okay. Thank you.
[Appeared in New York Public Library on March 31st 2015.]